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Abstract
We introduce a general decision-tree framework to value an option to invest/divest in a project,
focusing on the model risk inherent in the assumptions made by standard real option valuation
methods. We examine how real option values depend on the dynamics of project value and in-
vestment costs, the frequency of exercise opportunities, the size of the project relative to initial
wealth, the investor’s risk tolerance (and how it changes with wealth) and several other choices
about model structure. For instance, contrary to stylised facts from previous literature, real option
values can actually decrease with the volatility of the underlying project value and increase with
investment costs. And large projects can be more or less attractive than small projects (ceteris
paribus) depending on the risk tolerance of the investor, how this changes with wealth, and the
structure of costs to invest in the project.
Key words: CARA, CRRA, certain equivalent, decision tree, divestment, Hyperbolic Absolute Risk
Aversion, investment, mean-reversion, risk aversion, risk tolerance
JEL Classification: C44, D81, G13, G30
a Professor of Finance, University of Sussex, UK. Email: c.alexander@sussex.ac.uk
b Research and Development Analyst, Oxford Risk, London.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
00
81
7v
2 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  5
 Se
p 2
01
8
1 Introduction
The original definition of a real option, first stated by Myers (1977), is a decision opportunity for a
corporation or an individual. It is a right, rather than an obligation, whose value is contingent on the
uncertain price(s) of some underlying asset(s) and the costs incurred by exercising the option. The
term ‘investment’ real option concerns the opportunity to buy or sell a project (such as a property – real
estate, a company, a patent etc.) or a production process (such as an energy plant, or pharmaceutical
research and development). Following Kasanen and Trigeorgis (1995), we identify the project value
with a market price that is the ‘break-even’ price for which a representative decision maker would be
indifferent between buying or not buying the project. Any higher price would exceed her value and she
would not buy the project; any lower price would induce her to certainly buy the project.1 Similarly,
we identify the option strike with the investment cost for the project and in the following we shall use
these two terms synonymously. The real option value (ROV) is the value of this decision opportunity
to buy or sell the project; it is specific to the decision maker (i.e. the investor) and it will depend on
her attitude to risk. The ROV represents the certain dollar amount, net of financing costs, that the
decision maker should receive to obtain the same utility as the (risky) investment in the project. So,
unlike the premium on a financial option, the ROV has no absolute accounting value. In this setting,
ROVs merely allow the subjective ranking of opportunities to invest in alternative projects.2
The basic model for analysing investment real options assumes that the project value follows a
geometric Brownian motion (GBM) over a finite investment horizon, with a fixed or pre-determined
investment cost (i.e. the option strike), where all risks can be hedged so that risk-neutral valuation
(RNV) applies, and that decisions to invest or divest (i.e. exercise the option) may be implemented
at any time up to the investment horizon. Much recent literature on investment real option analysis
attempts to augment this basic model in various ways, to add special features that address particular
practical problems.3
However, our paper addresses a much more fundamental issue. Instead of following the main
strand of the real options literature, which adapts and extends the mathematical models to more
closely reflect the real-world characteristics of a particular investment opportunity, we shall drill-down
into the real option model itself to examine the model risk inherent in the assumptions that are made,
focussing on real options models that are most commonly applied in the literature.
The way that we can analyse model risk is by first building a very general model which encompasses
1We use the term ‘market price’ because this decision-maker’s value is representative of the market as a whole.
2For instance, just as financial investments are ranked using risk-adjusted performance measures, a pharmaceutical
firm may compare the values of developing alternative products, or an exploration company may compare the values of
drilling in different locations, or a property development corporation may compare the values of buying land in different
locations. The same utility function should be applied to value every investment opportunity (this characterises the
decision maker) but the decision-maker’s subjective views about the evolution of future uncertainties (such as the value
of a project and the associated costs of investment) is specific to each project.
3For example, in the renewable energy industry, technological developments now help small-scale production projects
gain competitive advantages, especially with various support schemes encouraging their adoption, and several recent
papers use real option methods to analyse the value of these developments.Dahlgren and Leung (2015) model the value
of an option to invest in a small-size production project taking into account temporary suspensions; Boomsma, Meade,
and Fleten (2012) model the optimal capacity choice of producing renewable energy under different support schemes;
Farzan, Mahani, Gharieh, and Jafari (2015) value an option to invest in microgrid assets, taking into account a variety
of risks as well as the possibility of temporary suspension of production.
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the standard assumptions, such as risk-neutral valuation, as special cases. In fact, we make very
flexible assumptions about: market price of the project; investment costs; the frequency of exercise
opportunities; the size of the project relative to the decision-maker’s wealth; the decision maker’s
utility function; and how her risk tolerance changes with wealth. To our knowledge this is the first
study of model risk associated with these factors, some of which have not even been considered before.
We do not assume that risks can be hedged by traded securities, but risk-neutral valuation tech-
niques still apply in the special case of a linear utility function. In this case, Grasselli (2011) proves
that the time-flexibility of the opportunity to invest in a project still carries a positive option value
for a risk-averse decision maker, so that the paradigm of real options can still be applied to value a
decision where none of the risks can be hedged. We also assume that the market price is the only
stochastic factor and that the option strike may be – but is not necessarily – related to the market
price of the project. In future work our general framework might be extendible to multiple correlated
sources of uncertainty, where partial hedging is possible. But it is already a considerable challenge to
build a model which is broad enough to encompass special cases corresponding to the specific choices
of project characteristics and investor preferences mentioned above. Indeed, we already analyse a
wide scope of questions about model risk, even without such model extensions. For instance: How is
the ROV affected if the drift in market price is mean-reverting? How does the frequency of exercise
opportunities affect the ROV? How does the ranking of different opportunities change as we increase
risk tolerance, or its sensitivity to wealth? Does the size of the investment relative to initial wealth
effect the ROV, and if so how? And what is the effect of the fixed or pre-determined cost assumption
relative to more general assumptions that costs are stochastic?
In the following: Section 2 motivates our framework with a concise overview of the literature on
investment real option models; Section 3 specifies the model mathematically; Section 4 answers the
questions posed above assuming a GBM process for the market price of the project and Section 5
examines the sensitivity of ROVs to changing the price-process assumptions; Section 6 summarises
and concludes. An Appendix aids understanding of our framework with some illustrative examples.
2 Real Options to Invest in a Project
Most of the early literature on investment real options focuses on opportunities to enter a tradable
contract with pre-determined strike in a complete market. For early models including a stochastic
strike, see McDonald and Siegel (1986), Quigg (1993) and Kulatilaka (1998). That is, the real option’s
pay-off can be replicated using tradable assets, so that all risks are hedgeable. Also, the decision
opportunity can be exercised continuously at any time over the decision horizon as, for instance, in
Kogut (1991), Grenadier (1996), Smith and McCardle (1998) and Patel, Paxson, and Sing (2005). In
this setting the option has the same value to all investors and so is priced as if the investor is risk
neutral using standard RNV techniques for American options. Basic real option models also suppose
the forward price follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with total return equal to the risk-free
rate, and the ROV is derived from a linear utility where exercise at a pre-determined strike may be
taken at any point in time. Capozza and Sick (1991), Trigeorgis (1993), Benaroch and Kauffman
(2000), Boer (2000), Yeo and Qiu (2002), and numerous others since all employ this basic framework.
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However, in practice, many investment opportunities encompassed by the original definition of
Myers (1977) are not standardised, tradable securities; their risks are only partially hedgeable, if at
all; investors are typically risk-averse; and investment costs are unlikely to be pre-determined. So the
RNV assumptions are clearly inappropriate for many real options, particularly those in real estate,
research & development or company mergers & acquisitions. In many applications the underlying
market is incomplete and the project is not something that can be bought and sold in a market,
indeed the transacted price may be negotiated between individual buyers and sellers. In this setting
there is no unique value for a real option – it will be specific to the decision maker, depending upon
her subjective views about the costs and benefits of investment in the project, and upon her risk
preferences. For instance, if an oil exploration company must decide whether to drill in location A or
location B, their views about the benefits of drilling in each location will depend on their subjective
beliefs about the market price of oil in the future as well as their risk tolerance. Hence, there is no
single accepted definition in the real option literature for the stochastic price process which drives
the project value. For instance, Slade (2001); Moel and Tufano (2002); Adkins and Paxson (2011);
Chronopoulos, De Reyck, and Siddiqui (2011); Alexander, Mo, and Stent (2012); Jaimungal, de Souza,
and Zubelli (2013) associate the market price of the project as the value of the project’s outputs;
Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004); Bøckman, Fleten, Juliussen, Langhammer, and Revdal (2008); Fontes
(2008); Franklin Jr (2015); Mac Cawley, Cubillos, and Pascual (2018) model the demand/production
capacity and their market price is the value of the products that generate the projects profit stream;
and Mun˜oz, Contreras, Caaman˜o, and Correia (2011); Luo, Wang, and Yang (2016) use the net present
value of the project’s future cash flows.
Several papers consider risk-averse decision makers in incomplete or partially complete markets,
often for decision makers with a utility function that admits closed-form solutions via maximization of
an expected utility. Henderson (2007), Miao and Wang (2007), Grasselli (2011), Adkins and Paxson
(2013) and Hagspiel, Huisman, Kort, and Nunes (2016) all investigate continuous-time, deterministic-
strike real options using a two-factor GBM framework in which the value of the project to the investor
is stochastic and possibly correlated with the price of a liquidly traded asset that may be used to hedge
the investment risk. In common with our approach, which is described in detail in the next section,
price processes are discounted to present value terms so that a univariate time 0 utility function may
be applied to maximise the expected utility of the maturity pay-off.
The process of real option valuation also determines an optimal exercise, assuming that this may
occur at any time in a continuous future. In practice these opportunities may only be possible at
fixed discrete points in time, such as at a weekly meetings of the investment committee or monthly
meetings of the board of directors, but there is no research to date on the effect of infrequent exercise
opportunities on the ROV. Our framework allows a decision-maker to quantify this effect. For instance,
the optimal decision at time 0 may be to invest if the market price falls by a given amount. But if the
board controls the decision to exercise the option, and the board meets only once per month or even
less frequently, then the ROV is likely to be lower than it is when exercise can happen at any point in
time. How much lower? This question can be addressed by designating a proper sub-set of nodes as
decision nodes in our general model.
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Trigeorgis (1996), Smit (1996), Branda˜o and Dyer (2005), Branda˜o, Dyer, and Hahn (2005, 2008)
and Smith (2005) all employ decision trees but, unlike us, they assume market-priced risk and thus
adopt the RNV framework, avoiding the explicit use of a utility. Mason and Merton (1985), Trigeorgis
and Mason (1987), De Reyck, Degraeve, and Vanderborre (2008) and Mun˜oz, Contreras, Caaman˜o,
and Correia (2011) also use decision trees, but with a constant risk-adjusted discount rate. Only
Grasselli (2011) applies a utility function in a decision tree for real option valuation and the exponential
(CARA) utility that he applies has substantial limitations – see Section 3.4 for details.
3 A General Framework for Investment Real Option Valuation
We apply the general hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility, introduced by Mossin (1968)
and Merton (1971). The downside of this generality is that analytic solutions are only available in
special cases (e.g. with an exponential utility and GBM). We do not rely on expansion approximations,
which can be unreliable. So all results in this paper are generated numerically. However, they can
all be verified – and extended by changing the (numerous) model parameters – using code that is
available to download.
When risks are unhedgeable the forward market price measure is subjective to the decision maker,
with the risk-neutral measure arising as the special case of a linear utility and a risk-free expected
return. The decision maker holds subjective views not only about the evolution of the market price
but also about the stream of cash flows (if any) that would be realised if she enters the investment
or begins the project. In most applications cash flows would reflect the individual management style
of the decision maker, e.g. aggressive, expansive, recessive etc. Our investment costs may have pre-
determined and/or stochastic components.
Exercise opportunities are discrete and are modelled using a binomial price tree with decision nodes,
corresponding to the possibility for exercise, placed at every k steps until a finite decision horizon T .
The consequence of the decision (which is taken at time 0) is valued at some finite investment horizon,
T ′ > T .4 Additionally, the decision maker is characterised by her initial wealth, w0 which represents
the current net worth of all her assets, and a HARA utility function U(w) which reflects her risk
tolerance λ and how this changes with wealth.
3.1 Market Prices and Cash Flows
All future market prices and cash flows are expressed in time 0 terms by discounting at the decision-
maker’s borrowing rate r.5 Thus the investor borrows funds at rate r to invest, rather than financing
the cost from her initial wealth, which is not available for investing in this project.6 We suppose that
r is a constant, risk-free rate. First we allow the market price of the project to follow a GBM, as
4We do not equate these horizons with the maturity of the investment, i.e. cash flows from the project may continue
beyond T ′, so the market price is not constrained to be the discounted expected value of the cash flows.
5This rate depends on the business risk of the project as perceived by the financer, not as perceived by the decision
maker. It may also depend on the decision-maker’s credit rating but this assumption is not common in the real options
literature.
6To avoid additional complexity we do not consider that projects could be financed from wealth, even though this
would be rational if wealth is liquid and r is greater than the return on wealth, r˜.
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usual, so that the discounted forward market price pt evolves as:
dpt
pt
= (µ− r) dt+ σ dWt, for 0 < t ≤ T ′, (1)
where µ and σ are the decision-maker’s subjective drift and volatility associated with pt and Wt is a
Wiener process. Then pt has a lognormal distribution, pt ∼ log N
(
(µ− r) t, σ2t).
It is convenient to use a binomial tree discretisation of (1) in which the price can move up or down
by factors u and d, so that pt+1 = ptu with probability pi and otherwise pt+1 = ptd. No less than
eleven different binomial parameterisations for GBM are reviewed by Chance (2008). Smith (2005),
Branda˜o and Dyer (2005), Branda˜o, Dyer, and Hahn (2005, 2008), Smit and Ankum (1993) and others
employ the ‘CRR’ parameterisation of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). However, the Jarrow and
Rudd (1982) parameterisation, which is commonly used by option traders, is more stable for low levels
of volatility and when there are only a few steps in the tree. Thus we set
m =
[
µ− r − 0.5σ2]∆t, u = em+σ√∆t, d = em−σ√∆t and pi = 0.5. (2)
Secondly, we employ a modification of (1) that represents a ‘boom-bust’ scenario via a regime-
dependent process, which trends upward with a low volatility for a sustained period and downward
with a high volatility for another sustained period. Thus we set:
dpt
pt
=
 (µ1 − r)dt+ σ1dWt, for 0 < t ≤ T1,(µ2 − r)dt+ σ2dWt, for T1 < t ≤ T ′. (3)
Finally, we consider a case where the decision maker believes the market price will mean-revert over
a relatively short time horizon. To represent this we suppose the expected return decreases following
a price increase but increases following a price fall, as in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
d ln pt = −ψ ln
(
pt
p¯
)
dt+ σdWt (4)
where ψ denotes the rate of mean reversion to a long-term price level p¯. Following Nelson and
Ramaswamy (1990) (NR) we employ the following binomial tree parameterisation for the discretised
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
u = eσ
√
∆t, d = u−1 (5a)
pis(t) =

1, 0.5 + νs(t)
√
∆t/2σ > 1
0.5 + νs(t)
√
∆t/2σ, 0 ≤ 0.5 + νs(t)
√
∆t/2σ ≤ 1
0, 0.5 + νs(t)
√
∆t/2σ < 0
(5b)
where
νs(t) = −ψ ln
(
ps(t)u
p¯
)
(5c)
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is the local drift of the log price process, and so the price process has local drift:
µs(t) = −ψ ln
(
ps(t)u
p¯
)
+ 0.5σ2 + r. (5d)
Note that when ψ = 0 there is a constant transition probability of 0.5 and the NR parameterisation
is equivalent to the parameterisation (2) with m = 0.
The cash flows may depend on the market price of the project (as do revenues from pharmaceutical
sales, for instance, or rents from a property). To capture this feature, we let s(t) denote the state
of the market at time t, i.e. a path of the market price from time 0 to time t written as a string of
u’s and d’s with t elements, e.g. s(3) = uud. Let CFs(t) denote the cash flow in state s(t) at time t.
Regarding cash flows as dividends we call the price excluding all cash flows before and at time t the
‘ex-dividend’ price, denoted p−s(t). At the time of a cash flow CFs(t) the market price follows a path
which jumps from p−s(t) to p
+
s(t) = p
−
s(t) + CFs(t). The investor does not receive CFs(t) if she invests in
the project at time t, but she does receives it if she divests in the project at time t.7 The dividend
yield is defined as
δs(t) =
p+s(t) − p−s(t)
p+s(t)
. (6)
We assume that dividend yields are deterministic and time but not state dependent, using the simpler
notation δt. Then the cash flows are both time and state dependent.
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3.2 Costs and Benefits of Investment and Divestment
Assumptions about costs are critical determinants of real option values. For example, if the cost is
stochastic and perfectly correlated with a martingale discounted project price then the RNV price
will be zero, yet a risk-averse investor could still place a positive value on such a decision opportunity.
We shall allow fixed, deterministic or stochastic investment costs which may be related to the market
price, because this is relevant to many practical situations (e.g. purchasing land for development or
investing in pharmaceutical research). Hence, the investment cost at time t, in time 0 terms, is:
Kt = αK + (1− α) g(p−t ), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (7)
where K is a constant in time 0 terms and g : R → R is some real-valued function linking the
investment cost to the market price. This function controls the correlation between costs and market
price of the project. For instance, cost is perfectly correlated with price when g is linear and increasing.
When α = 1 we have a standard real option with a pre-determined strike K, such as might be employed
for oil exploration decisions. When α = 0 there is only a variable cost, which is a deterministic function
7The alternative assumption that she receives the cash flow at time t only when she invests is also possible. The
subscript s(t) denotes a particular realisation of the random variable that carries the subscript t, e.g. p+uud and p
−
uud are
the left and right limits of a realisation of pt when t = 3. From henceforth we only use the subscript s(t) when it is
necessary to specify the state of the market – otherwise we simplify notation using the subscript t. Also, assuming cash
flow is not received when divesting at time t, p−t is a limit of pt from the right, not a limit from the left.
8If the cash flow is not state dependent, then the dividend yield must be state dependent. The state dependence of
cash flows induces an autocorrelation in them because the market price is autocorrelated. For this reason, defining an
additively separable multivariate utility over future cash flows as in Smith and Nau (1995) and Smith and McCardle
(1998) may be problematic.
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of the market price p−t . This might be employed for real estate, research and development or merger
and acquisition options. The intermediate case, with 0 < α < 1 has an investment cost with both
fixed and variable components.
We assume that initial wealth w0 earns a constant, risk-free lending rate r˜, as do any cash flows
paid out which are not re-invested. Any cash paid into the project (e.g. development costs) is financed
at the borrowing rate r. The financial benefit to the decision-maker on investing (action I) at time t is
the sum of any cash flows paid out and not re-invested plus the terminal market price of the project.
Thus the wealth of the decision-maker at T ′, in time 0 terms, following investment at time t is
wIt,T ′ = e
(r˜−r)T ′w0 +
T ′∑
s=t+1
e(r˜−r)(T
′−s)CFs + p−T ′ −Kt. (8)
Some projects pay no cash flows, or any cash flows paid out are re-invested in the project. Then
the financial benefit of investing at time t, in time 0 terms, is simply the cum-dividend price p˜t,T ′ of the
project accruing from time t. If a decision to invest is made at time t, with 0 ≤ t ≤ T , then p˜t,t = pt
but the evolution of p˜t,s for t < s ≤ T ′ differs to that of ps because p˜t,s will gradually accumulate all
future cash flows from time t onwards. In this case, when the decision maker chooses to invest at time
t her wealth at time T ′ in time 0 terms is
w˜It,T ′ = e
(r˜−r)T ′w0 + p˜t,T ′ −Kt. (9)
Note that if r˜ = r then also
∑T ′
s=t+1 e
(r˜−r)(T ′−s)CFs + p−T ′ = p˜t,T ′ in (8).
Similarly, if the decision maker already owns the project at time 0 and chooses to divest (action
S) at time t, the time 0 value of her wealth at time T ′ is
wSt,T ′ = e
(r˜−r)T ′w0 +
t−1∑
s=1
e(r˜−r)(T
′−s)CFs + p+t − p0. (10)
Note that p0 is subtracted here because we assume the investor has borrowed funds to invest in the
project. Alternatively, if there are no cash flows, or they are re-invested,
w˜St,T ′ = e
(r˜−r)T ′w0 + p˜0,t − p0. (11)
Finally, the wealth wDt,T ′ resulting from a defer decision at time t depends on whether she invests (or
divests) later on. This must therefore be computed using backward induction as described in the next
sub-section.
3.3 Optimal Decisions and Real Option Value
Denote the decision-maker’s utility function by U : R → R. As in any decision problem, we shall
compare the expected utility of the outcomes resulting from investment with the utility of a base-case
alternative, which in this case is to do nothing (so terminal wealth remains at w0 in time 0 terms).
9
9For brevity, we only describe the backward induction step for the decision to invest but it is similar for the decision
to divest. That is, for the divestment decision we compare the expected utility of the outcomes resulting from remaining
invested with the utility of the alternative, to divest.
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The option to invest at time t has time 0 utility value U It,T ′ = U
(
wIt,T ′
)
, but since wIt,T ′ is random so
is U It,T ′ , and we use the expected utility
E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
= E
[
U
(
wIs(t),T ′
)]
,
as a point estimate. Then, given a specific decision node at time t, say when the market is in state
s(t), the potential investor chooses to invest if and only if
E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
> E
[
UDs(t),T ′
]
,
and we set
E
[
Us(t),T ′
]
= max
{
E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
,E
[
UDs(t),T ′
]}
. (12)
Since there are no further decisions following a decision to invest, E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
can be evaluated di-
rectly, using the utility of the terminal wealth values obtainable from state s(t) and their associated
probabilities. However, E
[
UDs(t),T ′
]
depends on whether it is optimal to invest or defer at the decision
nodes at time t+1. Thus, the expected utilities at each decision node must be computed via backward
induction.
First we evaluate (12) at the last decision nodes in the tree, which are at the time T that option
expires. These nodes are available only if the investor has deferred at every node up to this point.
We associate each ultimate decision node with the maximum value (12) and select the corresponding
optimal action, I or D. Now select a penultimate decision node; say it is at time T − k∆t. If we use a
recombining binomial tree to model the market price evolution, it has 2k successor decision nodes at
time T .10 Each market state s(T − k∆t) has an associated decision node. Each one of its successor
nodes is at a market state s∗(T ) that is attainable from state s(T − k∆t), and has an associated
probability pis∗(T ) determined by the state transition probability of 0.5, given that we employ the
parameterisation (2).11 Using the expected utility associated with each attainable successor node,
and their associated probabilities, we compute the expected utility of the decision to defer at time
T − k∆t. More generally, assuming decision nodes occur at regular time intervals, the backward
induction step is:
E
[
UDs(t−k∆t),T ′
]
=
∑
s∗(t)
pis∗(t)E
[
Us∗(t),T ′
]
, t = k∆t, 2k∆t, . . . , T − k∆t, T. (13)
At each decision node we compute (13) and associate the node with the optimal action and its cor-
responding maximum expected utility. We repeat the backward induction until we arrive at a single
expected utility value associated with the node at time 0. Finally, the option value is the certainty
10The recombining assumption simplifies the computation of expected utilities at the backward induction step. How-
ever, we do not require that the binomial tree is recombining so the number of decision nodes could proliferate as we
advance through the tree. Note that the state price tree will recombine if cash flows are determined by a time-varying
but not state-varying dividend yield.
11So if the tree recombines these probabilities are 0.5k, k0.5k, k!/(2!(k− 2)!)0.5k, ...., k0.5k, 0.5k under the JR parame-
terization (2). If the CRR parameterisation is employed instead the transition probabilities for a recombining tree would
be more general binomial probabilities.
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equivalent (CE) of this expected utility, less the wealth resulting from the base-case alternative, i.e.
w0, where CE(w) = U
−1 (E[U(w)]) for any monotonic increasing utility U . The minimum value of
zero applies when the project would never be attractive whatever its future market price.
3.4 Risk Preferences
Much previous research on decision analysis of real options, reviewed in Section 2, employs either
risk-neutrality or an exponential utility function, which may be written in the form
U(w) = −λ exp
(
−w
λ
)
, (14)
where w denotes the terminal (time T ′) wealth of the decision maker, expressed in time 0 terms and
λ > 0 denotes her risk tolerance and γ = λ−1 is her risk aversion. Note that w is a random variable
taking values determined by the decision-maker’s (subjective) views on the evolution of the market
price and the decisions she takes before time T ′. Under (14) we have
CE(w) = −λ log
(
−E[U(w)]
λ
)
. (15)
This function is frequently employed because it has special properties that make it particularly
tractable (see Davis, Kabanov, Lipster, and Stoyanov, 2006, Chapter 6).
1. The exponential function (14) is the only utility with a CE that is independent of the decision-
maker’s initial wealth, w0.
12
2. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion is constant, as −U ′′(w)/U ′(w) = γ. Thus, the
exponential utility (14) represents decision makers with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
and λ in (14) is the absolute risk tolerance.
3. The CE of an exponential utility is additive over independent risks. When xt ∼NID(µ, σ2) and
wT = x1 + . . .+ xT then CE(wT ) = µT − (2λ)−1σ2T.
Unfortunately, properties 1 and 2 are very restricting. A major critique is that CARA decision makers
leave unchanged the dollar amount allocated to a risky investment when their initial wealth changes;
indeed, the decision maker’s wealth has no influence on her valuation of the option. Property 3
implies that when cash flows are normally and independently distributed (NID) the decision-maker’s
risk premium for the sum of cash flows at time t is (2λ)−1σ2t, so it scales with time at rate (2λ)−1σ2.
This could be used to derive the risk-adjustment term that is commonly applied to DCF models and
in the influential book by Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (1990).13
Economic analysis is commonly based on an inter-temporal consumption framework, for instance
as in Smith and Nau (1995) and Smith and McCardle (1998). Here decision-marker’s have a multivari-
ate utility given by a sum of time-homogenous exponential utilities over serially-independent future
12In other words, adding a constant to w results in only in an affine transformation which does not change the form
of the utility. This is also known as the ‘delta’ property. It implies that we obtain the same option value, and the same
optimal decisions, whether w denotes the P&L or net wealth.
13Setting µ exp[ra] = µ− (2λ)−1σ2 gives −ra = log[1− (2λµ)−1σ2], so ra ≈ (2λµ)−1σ2.
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cash flows. These particular assumptions are necessary because only then is the CE additive over
independent random variables, and the ROV is obtained by backward induction on the CE. But in
finance it is standard to base all utility on final wealth with future values discounted to time 0 terms,
as in Henderson (2007), Miao and Wang (2007) and Grasselli (2011) and many others since.
This discounting is an essential element of our approach because it allows the backward induction
step to be defined on the expected utility relative to any HARA utility which is just a univariate
function of terminal wealth. It is very important to note that using exponential preferences over
independent cash flows in this framework will yield the same decision (to invest, or to defer) at every
node in the tree because the uncertainties faced at any time are just scaled versions of the initial
uncertainties. Therefore, to reach beyond the restricting and trivial exponential-utility solutions, we
shall assume decision makers are endowed with a HARA utility, even though this comes at the expense
of analytic tractability, which may be written in the form:
U(w) = −(1− η)−1[1 + η
λw0
(w − w0)]1−η−1 , for w > (1− η−1λ)w0. (16)
where λ denotes the local relative risk tolerance, which increases linearly with wealth at the rate η.14
Here both absolute and relative risk aversion can increase with wealth, depending on the value of η.
We consider four special cases: when η → 0 we converge to the exponential utility; η = 1 corresponds
to the displaced logarithmic utility; η = 0.5 gives the hyperbolic utility; and η = λ yields the power
utility.
4 Model Risk under GBM
Investment real option values, and hence the ranking of alternatives, are influenced by a large number
of variables: (i) the fixed/variable cost structure of the investment; (ii) the scheduling of exercise
opportunities; (iii) the investor’s risk tolerance and its sensitivity to wealth; (iv) the size of the project
relative to the initial wealth; and (v) the decision-maker’s views on the evolution of market prices. In
this section we first investigate how the ROV depends upon assumptions (i) and (ii) when decision
makers have exponential utilities and the market price follows a given GBM (1).15 Then we investigate
(iii) by fixing the risk tolerance λ and seeing how our assumption about the rate at which λ increases
with wealth (which is zero in the exponential case) influences the ROV. Then, for property (iv),
employing both exponential and logarithmic utilities for illustration, we show how the ROV changes
with the size of the project revenues relative to initial wealth. Investigations of the ROV sensitivities
to expected returns and volatility, and how the ROV behaves for market price processes other than
GBM, are dealt with in Section 5.
14Note that an investor’s risk tolerance and its sensitivity to wealth may be specified using the techniques introduced
by Keeney and Reiffa (1993). Relative risk tolerance is expressed as a percentage of wealth, not in dollar terms. So
if, say, λ = 0.4 the decision maker is willing to take a gamble with approximately equal probability of winning 40% or
losing 20% of her wealth, but she would not bet on a 50:50 chance (approximately) of winning x% or losing x%/2 for
any x > 0.4.
15From henceforth we set r˜ = r. In the previous section it was important to specify the model in all its generality, but
insights to model risk based on using different lending and borrowing rates is a less important problem which is therefore
left to future research. To this end, the downloadable code accompanying this article allows one to set r˜ 6= r.
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4.1 Investment Costs
A variety of investment cost assumptions are made in the literature.16 In some applications – for
instance, when a licence to drill for oil has been purchased, and the decision concerns whether the
market price of oil is sufficient to warrant exploration – a fixed-strike or pre-determined cost assumption
could be valid. However, in many cases, the investment cost is linked to the market price. The
assumption about the investment cost has a crucial influence not only on the value of a real option
and its optimal exercise strategy but also on their sensitivity to changes in the input parameters.
Most papers do not question the effect that the cost assumptions have on the conclusions, ignoring the
potential model risk introduced by the cost assumptions, as noted by Slade (2001). She demonstrates
that the real option value modelled under a fixed cost assumption and a stochastic cost assumption,
differ drastically. Similarly, the constant drift assumption in GBM does not allow the modeller to
analyse the effect of decreasing/increasing trends in costs. Clearly, if the GBM drift decreases so that
expected costs decrease in future, the option value should increase. Fontes (2008) analyses the effect
that a GBM variable cost assumption has on the ROV and concludes that a more appropriate process
for variable cost would be mean-reverting.
A fixed cost, where α = 1 in (7), may be regarded as the strike of an American call option, and
the value is derived from the expected utility of a call option pay-off for which the upper part of the
terminal wealth distribution above the strike matters. The opposite extreme (α = 0) focuses on the
lower part of the terminal wealth distribution below the current price p0, where the investment costs
are lowest. Although log returns are similar across the whole spectrum under the GBM assumption
(1), changes in wealth are in absolute terms and are greater in the upper part of the distribution than
in the lower part. For this reason an at-the-money fixed-strike assumption yields a greater real option
value than the invest-at-market-price assumption.17
We illustrate these properties with an option to purchase a project that has no associated cash
flows. Suppose the current market price of the project is $1m and the investor believes this will evolve
according to (1) with µ and σ as specified in Table 1. The risk-free lending and borrowing rates are
both 5%. The investment horizon is T ′ = 5 years, investors have an exponential utility with risk
tolerance λ, and the initial wealth is $1m. As λ→∞ we have a linear utility, giving the option value
for a risk-neutral decision maker, and further setting µ = r gives the RNV solution. Decisions are
made once per year, so we set ∆t = k = 1. Using (2) we have m = 0.03, u = 1.259, d = 0.844 and
pi = 0.5. The investment cost takes the general form (7) with K = $1m. We set g(x) = x and compare
investment cost at market price (α = 0) with fixed time 0 cost (α = 1) and a mix of fixed and variable
cost (α = 0.5). We also consider g(x) = x/2 for variable cost at a fraction (in this case one-half)
of the market price, plus a fixed cost if α > 0, and set g(x) =
√
x for a variable cost that increases
non-linearly with market price, so the price and cost are not perfectly correlated. When g(x) =
√
x
the variable cost is less than (greater than) the current market price p−t if p
−
t > $1m (p
−
t < $1m).
16Among many others: Chronopoulos, De Reyck, and Siddiqui (2011) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004) use fixed
investment costs; deterministic costs are applied by Mac Cawley, Cubillos, and Pascual (2018), Dahlgren and Leung
(2015) and Franklin Jr (2015); Choi, Kwak, and Shim (2017) and Mun˜oz, Contreras, Caaman˜o, and Correia (2011) have
stochastic investment costs; and Fontes (2008) assumes a mixture of fixed and stochastic costs.
17However, this property only holds under GBM views for market prices, see Section 5.2 for a counter example under
different price processes.
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Table 1: Exponential utility option values for different risk tolerance λ and different investment costs struc-
tures, compared with risk-neutral values (linear utility, i.e. λ =∞, and µ = r). Here T ′ = 5 years, ∆t = k = 1,
K = p0 = $1m, r = 5%. When α = 1 (Column 3) the option strike is K; when α = 0.5 the option strike is of
the form (7) for the function g specified in row 1 of each section.
µ = 10% g(x) - x
√
x x/2
σ = 20% α 1 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
λ
0.1
Value 47,387 29,349 0 36,260 32,222 115,185 390,296
Year/State 3/uu 4/uuu - 4/uuu 4/uuu 4/u 4/-
0.5
Value 199,103 117,936 43,008 166,906 129,091 323,672 561,529
Year/State 2/uu 4/uu 0 4/uu 4/uu 4/u 2/dd
1
Value 261,839 157,221 141,249 218,048 170,077 393,401 641,249
Year/State 3/uuu 3/uud 0 4/uu 4/uu 2/ud 0
∞ Value 363,789 283,179 283,179 306,855 283,179 533,179 783,179
Year/State 2/uu 0 0 1/u 0 0 0
RNV
Value 160,122 80,030 0 124,891 89,661 270,281 499,604
Year/State 3/uuu 4/uuu - 4/uuu 4/uuu 4/uu 4/-
µ = 15% g(x) - x
√
x x/2
σ = 50% α 1 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
λ
0.1
Value 37,277 5,374 0 34,229 6,454 36,865 148,551
Year/State 3/uuu 4/uuuu - 4/uuu 4/uuuu 4/uuu 4/-
0.5
Value 151,743 36,014 3,023 125,942 82,806 181,581 341,763
Year/State 3/uuu 4/uuu 3/ddd 4/uuu 4/uuu 4/uu 3/ddd
1
Value 254,963 112,602 17,221 216,766 166,120 312,741 461,455
Year/State 4/uuu 4/uuu 2/dd 4/uuu 4/uuu 4/uu 2/dd
∞ Value 823,324 608,935 608,935 720,471 624,340 879,799 1,108,935
Year/State 3/uuu 0 0 2/uu 1/u 1/u 0
RNV
Value 376,412 186,519 0 306,003 235,593 359,591 485,545
Year/State 3/uuu 4/uuu - 4/uuu 4/uuu 4/uuu 4/-
Table 1 compares the ROVs under each cost assumption, for different decision makers with λ =
0.1, 0.5 and 1, with the ROV corresponding to the linear utility of a risk-neutral decision maker (λ =∞
and µ = r). Under the option value we report the optimal exercise strategy, denoted by year and
any market state that it is conditional upon. For instance, 1/d denotes invest at time 1 provided
the market price moved down between time 0 and 1, and 4/uu denotes invest at time 4 provided
the market price moved up between time 0 and 1, and again between time 1 and 2, irrespective of
later market price moves. Investment at time 0 has no market state, 4/− denotes invest in year 4
irrespective of the price state, and never invest is marked simply −.
The option value increases with λ, as in Henderson (2007), because the more risk tolerant the
decision maker, the lower the risk premium required to invest. As λ → ∞ the value converges to
the risk-neutral (linear utility) value, which is greater than the standard RNV option price because,
in this case, µ > r. Clearly, the risk-averse ROV can be much less than it is under RNV especially
when risk tolerance is low, or much greater than it is under RNV especially when risk tolerance is
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high. Indeed when α = 0 and g(x) = x, i.e. the investment cost is at the market price, the RNV
price is always zero: the CE of a linear utility is the expected value of terminal wealth, and since the
discounted price is always a martingale under the risk-neutral measure, CE = w0; so RNV price of
an opportunity to invest at market price is always zero. By contrast, the risk-averse decision maker
places a positive value on the option in this case, except when λ = 0.1, when she would choose not to
invest at any market price.18
The cost structure also affects the exercise strategy. For a finite λ the optimal time to invest
is never shorter than for the risk-neutral decision maker, as shown by Henderson (2007). Further,
when α = 0 and g(x) = x, optimal investment is never conditional on a price rise, though it may be
conditional on a price fall. Investment also becomes conditional on a price fall but not a rise when
α = 0 and g(x) = kx, for 0 < k < 1, except that ‘never invest’ is not possible, since the last period
pay-off is x− kx > 0 so an optimal strategy always invests at or before the last period of the option.
But when g(x) =
√
x the last period pay-off x − √x > 0 only when x > 1, i.e. after price rise, and
optimal investment becomes conditional on up moves. Although we only display results for k = 0.5 a
similar conclusion holds for other k with 0 < k < 1. When α = 0.5 or 1 there is a fixed cost component
with an at-the-money call option pay-off which is positive only if the price rises. Thus, in Table 1
any condition on optimal exercise is for up moves in price. Finally, the RNV approach typically (but
not always) gives an optimal time of investment that is later than the optimal time for a risk-neutral
decision maker.
4.2 Exercise Opportunities
We find no previous research which examines the effect of introducing infrequent exercise opportunities.
Whether time is discrete or continuous, real option models have previously always assumed that
decisions made at time 0 for optimal investment at some time t ≥ 0 can always be implemented at that
time t. In this section we show how our general framework can model this feature by designating a sub-
set of special nodes in the tree as the only opportunities for exercising the investment. The ROV should
not decrease when there is more flexibility in the timing of investments. If the decision never changes
as a result of including more or less decision nodes, the option value will remain unchanged. Otherwise,
the ROV increases as more decisions are allowed. Having fewer nodes for exercise opportunities places
more constraints on the investment opportunity so the project will become less attractive to any
decision maker.
The results in Table 2 quantify this effect.19 We again consider an opportunity to invest in a
project with no associated cash flows and current market price $1m. The decision maker has an
exponential utility and the real option is characterised by the parameter values given in the legend to
the table. Thus, there are 60 monthly steps in the binomial tree for the market price, we place decision
nodes every k steps in the backward induction algorithm (13), and the last exercise opportunity is
at T = T ′ − k∆t. For instance, if k = 12 the nodes occur only once per year and the last exercise
18These observations are not specific to the parameters chosen for Table 1. Qualitatively similar properties are evident
using other real option parameters, as can be verified by changing the parameters of the downloadable code.
19It is important that the trees are nested, i.e. no new decision nodes are inserted as their number decreases, because
only in this way does reducing the number of nodes capture the effect of placing additional constraints on decision
opportunities.
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Table 2: Effect of frequency of exercise opportunities on real option value. w0 = p0 = $1m,T ′ = 5yrs,∆t =
1/12, T = T ′ − k∆t, r = 5%, µ = 15%, σ = 50%. Exponential utility, different λ and k.
α = 0: invest at market price
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 ∞
k
12 109.5 1,132 3,712 8,197 14,480 645,167
6 142.2 1,344 4,309 9,212 16,089 645,167
3 163.9 1,471 4,618 9,803 17,022 645,167
1 176.9 1,553 4,828 10,185 17,624 645,167
α = 1: fixed strike with present value $1m
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 ∞
k
12 49,385 115,086 174,731 223,201 263,614 881,419
6 71,365 144,638 204,078 252,243 292,632 908,333
3 86,062 157,289 214,375 263,019 303,834 919,322
1 93,115 166,450 225,568 273,619 313,888 926,058
opportunity is taken at the fourth year. So that the four decision trees are nested the values considered
for k are 12, 6, 3 and 1 representing decision evaluations once per year and once every 6 months, 3
months and 1 month. For decision makers with different levels of risk tolerance λ, Table 2 reports
results for the two extreme cost cases: the upper part shows the value of the option to invest at market
price and the lower part shows the value of the option to invest at a fixed cost K = $1m. In both
cases the option values increase when more decision nodes occur in the tree, i.e. as k decreases.
4.3 Risk Tolerance
ROVs for risk-averse decision makers always increase with risk tolerance, but they can be greater than
or less than the RNV option price, depending on the decision maker’s risk tolerance and their expected
return on an investment. Two recent papers examine the effect of changing risk tolerance on the value
of a real option. Chronopoulos, De Reyck, and Siddiqui (2011) employ a one-factor setting where
investment costs consist entirely of risky cash flows, so the marginal cost of investing will increase
with risk aversion. Assuming a GBM project value with continuous investment opportunities for a
decision maker with HARA utility, the authors show that the marginal benefit of waiting to invest
decreases relatively more than costs, as risk aversion increases. As a result, the marginal utility of the
pay-off increases, thereby increasing the incentive to postpone investment and the ROV decreases as
risk aversion increases. Using a CRRA utility, but in a two-factor GBM setting, Choi, Kwak, and Shim
(2017) confirm this result. They introduce a model where the decision-maker’s risk attitude depends
on her subjective discount rate for the expected utility of the option pay-off, with a lower discount
rate being associated with more risk-averse behaviour. As the investor’s risk tolerance increases so
also does the ROV and the later the optimal timing of the investment.
This section generalises the above result to the HARA utility case to ask how the assumption
made about the rate change of risk tolerance with wealth influences the ROV. To this end we assume
the local relative risk tolerance coefficient is λ at time 0 and that it increases with wealth linearly at
rate η. To benchmark HARA utility ROVs against exponential utility ROVs, which have constant
absolute risk tolerance λ, we set w0 = $1m. Thus, λw0 = λ, i.e. the absolute risk tolerance is the
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same for all utilities at the time of the decision. Figure 1 considers the options to invest (a) at market
price and (b) at a fixed time 0 cost equal to the current market price. We suppose the current market
price is p0 = $1m and the other real option characteristics are:
T ′ = 5yrs,K = $1m, g(x) = x,∆t = 1/12, k = 3, r = 5%, µ = 15%, σ = 50%. (17)
Figure 1: Comparison of invest option values under exponential, logarithmic, power and hyperbolic utilities
as a function of risk tolerance. Real option values on the vertical scale have been multiplied by 1000 for clarity.
Parameters are as in (17).
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The lines in each figure depict the exponential, logarithmic, hyperbolic and power utility ROVs
as a function of λ, with 0 < λ ≤ 1. For typical value of risk tolerance (0 < λ < 1) the exponential
and logarithmic utility values provide lower and upper ROV bounds, respectively and the ROVs
derived from other HARA utilities lie between these bounds. At very high risk tolerance, i.e. λ > 1,
hyperbolic utility values still lie between the exponential and logarithmic values, but the power utility
values exceed the logarithmic values, and as λ increases further the power values can become very
large indeed because the risk tolerance increases extremely rapidly with wealth.
Because of the boundary in (16) HARA utilities are not always well-behaved, unlike exponential
utilities. But we have shown that exponential utility values are too low when the decision maker’s risk
tolerance increases with wealth, which is a more realistic assumption than CARA. For typical values of
risk tolerance, power utilities produce reliable ROVs, but with very high risk tolerance logarithmic or
hyperbolic utility representations maybe more appropriate, the former giving ROVs that are greater
than the latter. Note that these results also show that we can use exponential and logarithmic utility
values as lower and upper bounds for other HARA utility values, within the range 0 < λ < 1.
4.4 Relative Size
The larger the project relative to the decision-maker’s initial wealth w0, the higher the current project
price and (for fixed µ and σ in the GBM) the more variable the terminal change in wealth. Hence,
if the decision-maker is very risk averse, the ROV is likely to decrease as the project size increases
(relative to wealth). However, if the decision-maker has very high risk tolerance the opposite could
occur, i.e. ROV might actually increase with project size, relative to inital wealth.
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We have found no previous investigation into these questions and how the answers relate to the
structure of the investment costs. The closest work is in Choi, Kwak, and Shim (2017) who argue
that, for CRRA utilities with fixed investment costs, ROVs will increase as the size of the project
relative to initial wealth decreases. Note that a similar effect can be present for CARA utilities: even
though the exponential utility value is independent of initial wealth, as previously noted in Section
3.4, CARA ROVs still depend on the volatility of the option pay-off, and this increases with the size
of the investment in the project.
In this section we use our model to quantify the effects of project size by fixing initial wealth w0 at
$1m and supposing p0 is either $0.1m, $1m or 10$m, keeping all other real option characteristics fixed,
at the values (17). We only depict exponential and logarithmic ROVs because, from the previous
section, these are approximate lower and upper bounds for HARA utilities.
Figure 2: Real option values under exponential and logarithmic utilities as a function of risk tolerance λ,
T ′ = 5, ∆t = 1/12, k = 3, r = r˜ = 5%, µ = 15%, σ = 50%, K = p0 = $0.1, $1, $10m, w0 = 1m, 0.1 ≤ λ ≤ 100,
ROV in $m. Both axes in log10 scale.
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Figure 2 displays the ROV for different values of the local risk tolerance λ between 0.1 and 100,
both axes being drawn on a base 10 log scale. We go beyond the range 0 < λ < 1 to examine the
convergence of ROVs as λ → ∞, for comparison with the RNV case. We depict ROVs for α = 0
(invest at market price) on the left, and α = 1 (fixed ATM strike at p0) on the right. The values
for the largest investment (p0 = 10w0) are represented by red lines, those for the smallest investment
(p0 = 0.1w0) are in black and those for the medium investment (p0 = w0) are blue. In each case as
λ→∞, the ROV converges to the value obtained for a risk-neutral investor, which increases with p0.
In both figures, the relative size of the investment in the project governs the sensitivity of the ROV
to λ, with larger investments having ROVs that are more sensitive to risk tolerance. Consider the
left-hand figure (α = 0) where the option is to invest at market price (Kt = p
−
t ) and hence the RNV
option price is zero. Given that the drift and volatility of the GBM process driving the market price
dynamics is not affected by p0, all decision makers with 0 < λ < 1 will prefer the smaller investment
to the larger ones, but as risk tolerance increases the larger investments become more attractive than
the smaller ones. Also note that the parameter η, i.e. the rate at which risk tolerance grows with
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wealth, has much lesser effect on the ROV since exponential and logarithmic values remain close to
each other throughout. As λ increases the ROVs converge towards the risk-neutral subjective value,
which is non-zero (because µ 6= r) and which increases with project size.
By contrast, in the right-hand Figure 2 where the costs Kt are fixed at $1m (i.e. α = 1) the RNV,
marked by the dotted horizontal line, is non-zero. It is less than the risk-neutral subjective value to
which the ROV converges as λ→∞, simply because we have chosen µ > r in this case; if we had set
µ < r the RNV would exceed the asymptotic value in the figure, irrespective of the investment size.
As we move from a variable to a fixed cost structure the main difference is that larger investments
are always ranked highest. The exponential ROV (solid lines) are now well below the logarithmic ROV
(dashed lines) showing that assumptions about η can be important, especially for a highly risk-averse
decision maker facing the fixed-strike option to invest in a high-priced project. In general, risk-neutral
decision makers attribute higher ranks to larger investments; risk-averse decision makers also tend to
prefer larger fixed-strike investments; but when an investment is at market price, smaller investments
are ranked more highly even by investors with very low values risk-aversion.
5 Model Risk in Price Process Dynamics
Slade (2001) introduces a model with three state variables – price, cost, and reserves, finding that the
dynamic models that are selected for these processes greatly affect the ROV. In particular, the option
values associated with non-stationary processes are systematically larger than the comparable station-
ary values. Also, assuming a GBM for price/cost processes substantially overvalues the option value
relative to the mean-reverting case. However, with two notable exceptions (discussed in more detail
below) all the real-options literature which examines the sensitivity of real options to assumptions
made about the price process employs the risk-neutral paradigm.
Section 5.1, examines how the parameters of a GBM price process affect the ROV. This problem
has been analysed in many previous papers, albeit within a particular real-world application where
other basic assumptions are made – typically RNV. So we set our more general results, based on
HARA utilities, in the context of this research.20 Next, in Section 5.2 we consider an option to invest
in a project when the decision maker’s views are captured by a ‘boom-bust’ process (3) where a long
period of positive price momentum could be followed by a crash. The question of model risk has not
previously been analysed in this context. Finally, in Section 5.3 we analyse real options for decision
makers who believe in a mean-reverting price process (4). There is some previous literature on this
extension, reviewed below, but all the papers that we can find are based on RNV.
5.1 Risk Sensitivity
ROVs may decrease or increase with volatility, depending on the cost structure of the project and
the decision maker’s risk preferences. Much prior work, based on a variety of different assumptions
for the underlying price process, costs and the valuation measure, finds that ROVs increase with
20The decision maker has subjective values for µ and σ, but these may be highly uncertain if she lacks confidence in
her views. Indeed, while the decision maker can lose her patience of waiting which leads to an increase in the discount
rate applied to the expected utility of the option pay-off it is perhaps more likely that she is highly uncertain about her
views, and subsequently adjusts her subjective values for µ and σ. In this case, it will be important to examine the
sensitivity of ROVs to the expected returns and risks of the project.
17
volatility.21 Only a few papers challenge this result, arguing this relationship can be reversed in some
circumstances. For instance, Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004) assume a fixed cost and a concave utility,
and argue that the increase in the volatility can decrease the option value of waiting when the expected
utility of the option’s pay-off is a convex function over time. Choi, Kwak, and Shim (2017) assume
a GBM cost and a CRRA utility, and demonstrate that the ROV can decrease with volatility when
the discount rate is low enough. In this section we use our general framework to capture a drastic
decrease or increase in the ROV as σ increases, thus demonstrating that the sensitivity of the ROV
to volatility depends heavily on the model assumptions.
Figure 3: Option values under exponential and logarithmic utilities with λ = 0.2, as a function of the investor’s
subjective views on expected return µ and volatility σ. ROV value in $m for p0 = $1m, w0 = $10m, r = 5%, T
′ =
5,∆t = 1/12, k = 3.
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Figure 3 depicts the values of a real option to invest as a function of the drift and volatility of
the GBM market price process, with other parameters fixed as stated in the legend. When α = 0
(left-hand figure) the option value always decreases as uncertainty increases due to the risk aversion
of the decision maker. For high uncertainty (σ greater than about 30%) the exponential utility values
are zero: the investment opportunity is valueless because the price would never fall far enough (in the
decision maker’s opinion) for investment to be profitable. By contrast, the logarithmic utility always
yields a positive value when expected return is greater than about 10%, but again the decision maker
becomes more likely to defer investment as the volatility increases. Indeed, the option values are
monotonically decreasing in σ at every µ, and monotonically increasing with µ for every σ. However,
21A selection of recent literature that supports this relationship includes: Franklin Jr (2015), Chronopoulos, De Reyck,
and Siddiqui (2011), Bøckman, Fleten, Juliussen, Langhammer, and Revdal (2008) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004)
– these assume a GBM price process; Mac Cawley, Cubillos, and Pascual (2018) and Mun˜oz, Contreras, Caaman˜o,
and Correia (2011) – these papers set a mean-reverting price process; Regarding costs, of course RNV option prices
always increase with volatility when these are fixed – but more generally, Mac Cawley, Cubillos, and Pascual (2018),
Franklin Jr (2015), Chronopoulos, De Reyck, and Siddiqui (2011) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004) assume with a fixed
or deterministic investment cost, whilst Mun˜oz, Contreras, Caaman˜o, and Correia (2011) and Bøckman, Fleten, Juliussen,
Langhammer, and Revdal (2008) set the investment cost to be stochastic; for the valuation measure Mac Cawley, Cubillos,
and Pascual (2018), Franklin Jr (2015), Bøckman, Fleten, Juliussen, Langhammer, and Revdal (2008) and most of the
other papers cited here value the option under the risk-neutral measure – exceptions include Chronopoulos, De Reyck,
and Siddiqui (2011), who adopt a HARA utility, Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004) consider a concave utility and Mun˜oz,
Contreras, Caaman˜o, and Correia (2011) employ the physical measure with a risk-adjusted discount rate.
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the ROV volatility sensitivity is quite different for the fixed-strike option, i.e. for α = 1. For instance,
the logarithmic ROV can decrease as σ increases, when µ is low. When µ = r the logarithmic ROV
increases monotonically with σ, as in the RNV case.
The sensitivity of the option value to both µ and σ also decreases as risk tolerance increases. To
illustrate this we give a simple numerical example, for the case α = 0 and an exponential utility.
Suppose µ = 20%. If λ = 0.2 the option value is $1, 148 when σ = 40% and $241, 868 (almost 211
times larger) when σ = 20%. When λ = 0.8 the option value is $167, 716 when σ = 40%; but now
when σ = 20% it only increases by a multiple of about 4, to $713, 812. Similarly, fixing σ = 20% but
now decreasing µ from 20% to 10% the value changes from $241, 867 to $109 (2, 210 times smaller)
for λ = 0.2, but from $713, 812 to $113, 959 (only about 6 times smaller) when λ = 0.8. Hence, the
option value’s sensitivities to µ and σ are much greater for low levels of risk tolerance. Similar, but
less pronounced, effects are present with the logarithmic and other HARA utilities, as can be verified
using the downloadable code.
5.2 Momentum
Many markets are subject to booms and recessions, or periodically collapsing bubbles. To name a
few examples: the price of gold – which underpins associated mining projects – recently reached a
peak in 2016, since when it has been generally declining; surges in the price of the cryptocurrency
Bitcoin have caused the value of projects based on Initial Coin offering (ICOs) to rise and fall over
long periods during the last few years; and the real-estate market has experienced several booms and
busts since the second world war.
Clearly, when the investment horizon is many years away, a decision maker may wish to take
account of long periods of upward and/or downward trending markets in her views about expected
returns. For illustration, consider a simple boom-bust scenario over a 10-year horizon: the expected re-
turn is negative, µ1 < 0 for the first n years and positive, µ2 > 0 for the remaining 10−n years. Deriving
approximate parameter values from observations on real estate values,22 we set µ1 = −10%, σ1 = 50%
and µ2 = 10%, σ2 = 30%. We suppose decisions are taken every quarter with ∆t = 0.25 and set
r = 5% in the price evolution tree. The ROVs given in Table 3 are for decision makers having expo-
nential utility, with varying levels of risk tolerance between 0.2 and 1 and the recession is believed to
last n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 years.23
When n = 0 or n = 10 we have a standard GBM price process, so for any given λ the project
in the upper of the table, with the invest-at-market-price option (α = 0) has a lower ROV than the
ROV for the project with the fixed-strike option (α = 1) in the lower part of the table. However, for
intermediate values of n the invest-at-market-price option often has a higher value than the fixed-strike
option. This ordering becomes more pronounced as n increases, because when α = 0 the investment
cost decreases with n, and if the price rises after investment the profits will be greater than for the
22The average annualised return computed from monthly data on the Vanguard REIT exchanged-traded fund (VQN)
from January 2005 to December 2006 was 21% with a volatility of 15%. However, from January 2007 to December 2009
the property market crashed, and the VQN had an average annualised return of −13% with a volatility of 58%. But
from January 2010 to June 2011 its average annualised return was 22% with volatility 24%.
23Results for the divest option, or for the invest option under different utilities are not presented, for brevity, but are
available on request. The qualitative conclusions are similar.
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Table 3: Effect of a time-varying drift for the market price, with downward trending price for first n years
followed by upward trending price for remaining 10 − n years. Exponential utility with different levels of risk
tolerance, with λ = ∞ corresponding to the risk-neutral (linear utility) value. Real option values in bold are
the maximum values, for given λ. p0 = $1 million, w0 = $1 million, T
′ = 10, ∆t = 0.25, k = 1, T = T ′ −∆t,
r = 5%, µ1 = −10%, µ2 = 10%, σ1 = 50% and σ2 = 20%.
α = 0
n 0 2 4 6 8 10
λ
0.2 866 382,918 727,922 438,482 174,637 0
0.8 211,457 1,230,035 2,297,909 1,148,695 370,354 0
1.0 266,752 1,349,295 2,552,434 1,300,724 406,567 0
∞ 648,173 2,234,361 4,777,950 5,308,672 1,045,800 0
α = 1
n 0 2 4 6 8 10
λ
0.2 164,721 391,060 552,578 194,371 51,040 5,022
0.8 392,866 961,279 1,704,007 692,529 159,663 14,943
1.0 432,280 1,064,416 1,938,157 821,733 186,257 17,191
∞ 740,493 1,989,551 4,339,659 4,860,376 841,706 50,787
fixed-cost option. Irrespective of cost structure, in this example the preferred investments are those
for which boom and bust periods are of roughly equal length.
5.3 Mean Reversion
Some earlier research analyses investment real options based on mean-reversion in the project value
process but, like Slade (2001), these papers assume risks can be perfectly hedged and therefore employ
RNV: Mac Cawley, Cubillos, and Pascual (2018) consider a discrete time model with deterministic
costs where the underlying commodity price is mean-reverting; and in a two-factor continuous-time
setting with mean-reverting project value and investment costs, Jaimungal, de Souza, and Zubelli
(2013) show that the investment threshold depends on the ratio between project value and cost.
In the risk-neutral world it is well-known that an option value will decrease as the mean-reversion
becomes stronger; in a sense, increasing the speed of mean-reversion is similar to decreasing volatility.
Is this also the case when we apply utility valuation for a risk-averse investor? We can use our model
to answer this question by examining how a risk-averse decision-maker’s belief in price mean-reversion
influences her ROV. To this end we assume the price of the project follows the OU process (4) with
p¯ = p0. We employ the NR parameterisation (5), allowing the speed of mean reversion ψ to vary
between 0 and 0.1, the case ψ = 0 corresponding to GBM and ψ = 0.1 giving the fastest characteristic
time to mean revert of 10 time-steps (so, assuming these are quarterly, this represents 2.5 years).24
The other parameters are fixed, as stated in the legend to Figure 4, which displays the real option
values for α = 0 and α = 1 as a function of ψ.
Increasing the speed of mean-reversion has a similar effect to decreasing volatility. Hence, fixed-
cost option values can decrease with ψ, as they do on the right graph of Figure 4 (α = 1) especially
when the decision maker has logarithmic utility. By contrast, the invest-at-market-price (α = 0)
24Lower values for ψ have slower mean-reversion, e.g. ψ = 0.02 corresponds to a characteristic time to mean revert of
φ = 0.02−1/4 = 12.5 years if time-steps are quarterly.
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Figure 4: Comparison of option values under HARA utilities with respect to mean-reversion rate ψ. w0 =
$1m, r = 5%, k = 1 and λ = 0.4 T ′ = 10, ∆t = 1/4, K = p0 = $1m, T = T ′−∆t, σ = 40%. Characteristic time
to mean-revert φ = ∆t/ψ in years, e.g. with ∆t = 1/4 then ψ = 0.02→ φ = 12.5yrs, ψ = 0.1→ φ = 2.5yrs.
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option displays values that increase with ψ. Note that for fixed ψ these values could increase with σ,
due to the positive effect of σ in the local drift (5d).25
Now consider a risk-neutral decision maker who wishes to rank two investment opportunities, A
and B. Both have mean-reverting price processes but different ψ and σ: project A has a relatively
rapid mean-reversion in its price (ψ = 1/10, φ = 2.5 years) with a low volatility (σ = 20%) and project
B has a relatively slow mean-reversion in its price (ψ = 1/40, φ = 10 years) with a higher volatility
(σ = 40%). Such an investor would have a great preference for project B since she is indifferent to
the high price risk and has regard only for the local drift. Given the slow rate of mean-reversion,
she sees only the possibility of a sharp fall in price – at which point she would invest – followed by a
long upward trend in its price. Indeed, assuming p0 = p¯ = $1m the risk-neutral value of option B is
$797,486, but the corresponding value for option A is only $98,077.
Table 4: Comparison of invest option values for project A (ψ = 1/10, σ = 20%) and project B (ψ = 1/40,
σ = 40%) with λ = 0.4 or 0.8 . All other parameter values are the same as in Figure 4. For each utility we
highlight the preferred project in bold.
λ 0.4 0.8 ∞
A B A B A B
Exponential 30,421 12,952 52,732 43,947
98,077 797,486
Hyperbolic 33,526 17,563 55,230 58,909
Power 33,045 16,651 56,365 68,051
Logarithmic 19,890 21,260 56,986 73,131
25This effect is only evident for values of ψ below a certain bound, depending on the utility function and other real
option parameters. For the parameter choice of Figure 4 the invest-at-market-price option values have their usual negative
sensitivity to σ once ψ exceeds approximately 2, where the characteristic time to mean revert is 1/8th of a year or less.
Detailed results are not reported for lack of space, but are available from the authors on request.
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However, once we relax the risk-neutral assumption the ranking of these two investment opportuni-
ties may change, depending on the utility of the decision maker. The real option values for risk-averse
decision makers with high risk tolerance (λ = 0.8) or low risk tolerance (λ = 0.4) are shown in Table
4. In each case the greater option value is depicted in bold. This shows that an investor with a loga-
rithmic utility would also prefer project B, as would an investor with a relatively high risk tolerance
(λ = 0.8) and a hyperbolic or a power utility. In all other cases the decision maker would prefer
project A.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The value of an investment real option is the net present value that, if received with certainty, would
give a risk-averse decision maker the same utility value as the expected utility of the uncertain invest-
ment. Such values enable the decision maker to rank opportunities to invest in alternative projects
and the process of valuing the option also specifies an optimal time to exercise. The minimum value
of zero applies when the project would not be attractive whatever its future value.
The special case of RNV, while most commonly employed in the literature, only applies to a real
option that is tradable on a secondary market. Therefore, we introduce a general methodology with
applications to a wide range of private investment or divestment decisions where project risks are
based on a source of uncertainty which cannot be hedged. It permits risk-averse private companies,
publicly-funded entities, or individuals to compute a real option value that is completely tailored to the
decision maker, based on a very flexible risk preference model (HARA), where views on the dynamics
of the project price process can take several forms and with investment costs that have both fixed and
variable components.
In this paradigm, ROVs can be very different from the risk-neutral price obtained under the
standard but (typically) invalid assumption of perfectly-hedgeable risks. This is significant because
such decisions can have profound implications for the decision maker’s economic welfare. For instance,
an individual’s investment in housing may represent a major component of her wealth and should
not be viewed simply in expected net present value terms, nor should all uncertainties be based on
systematic risk because they are largely un-hedgeable. Private companies typically generate returns
and risks that have a utility value that is specific to the owners’ outlook. Likewise, publicly-funded
entities may have objectives that are far removed from wealth maximisation under risk-neutrality.
The real option price that is obtained using standard RNV assumptions can be very much greater
than or less than the value that would be found using a more realistic assumptions about investment
costs in an incomplete market, and very often the RNV approach would specify a later investment
time. When risks cannot be hedged, the risk-averse decision maker’s ranking of different real options
depends heavily on how her risk tolerance changes with wealth, and so it becomes necessary to employ
a HARA utility function in order to capture this feature of model risk.
We have introduced a very general ROV model and applied it to answer several important questions
relating to the model risk in real option models, many of which have not previously been addressed.
Our main conclusions can be summarised as follows:
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(i) The assumption about the investment cost, whether it is pre-determined or stochastic, has a
significant influence on the real option value. The pre-determined-strike assumption can signif-
icantly over-estimate the value of a real option when the more-appropriate assumption is that
the investment cost is positively related to the market price, or has both a fixed and variable
components. Fixed-strike options may be more realistic for a decision maker having significant
market power, who can use this power to influence the investment cost in her favour. Intuitively,
real options can be more valuable for those decision makers – less powerful decision makers have
to bear more uncertainty in investment costs.
(ii) It is important to account for the flexibility of the decision-making process in real option analysis
because the real option value increases with the frequency of decision opportunities. Hence, due
to operational reasons (e.g. infrequent board meetings), in reality, the real option value should
be much lower than the standard continuous-time, risk-neutral value.
(iii) ROVs within the HARA class are bounded above by logarithmic utility values with the (more
usual) exponential utility values providing only a lower bound. The option value function is a
convex (concave) monotonically increasing function of risk tolerance when investment costs are
perfectly correlated (uncorrelated) with the project value.
(iv) The value of the project relative to the decision maker’s wealth matters a great deal. For instance,
the smaller (greater) the risk tolerance of the decision maker, the higher she ranks the option
to invest in a relatively low-priced (high-priced) project, when the project price dynamics follow
the same GBM process. Intuitively, the more risk averse, the more the decision maker would
favour a small project over a more valuable but costly one, even if two projects are exposed to
the same risks.
(v) Under the GBM assumption the sensitivity of a fixed-strike real option to the volatility of the
market price may be always positive (as in the RNV approach) but there are some cases when
it may be always negative. This sensitivity increases as risk aversion increases. Our framework
is flexible enough to capture both positive and negative volatility effect on the ROV;
(vi) Projects with values which trend strongly over long periods of time tend to be less attractive
to risk-averse investors than those with mean-reverting project values. When projects value
mean-revert the option value can increase or decrease with risk tolerance, depending on the cost
structure.
To aid further research in the area of decision-tree analysis for real options valuation, Matlab code
for all the examples can be downloaded by the reader and the parameters may be changed to any
reasonable value, set by the user in order to compute values for particular real options that are
formulated to model real-world decision problems. This way, any number of specific results on model
risk may be generated.
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Appendix: Numerical Examples
To fix ideas, here we depict some simple decision trees representing different types of real options. In
this section we shall only illustrate the simple cost structure (7) with α = 0 and g(x) = x, i.e. the
transacted price is the market price of the project. Matlab code is available from the authors for these
and the more complex examples included in the paper.
First we consider a decision opportunity which provides a concrete example of the zero-correlation
case considered by Grasselli (2011), where the opportunity to invest should still have a positive value.
A second example shows that the equivalent divest decision also has a positive value. The tables in
this section rank competing projects by computing ROVs under various assumptions: (i) the decision-
maker’s (subjective) market price for each alternative follows the dynamics (1) with a different (project-
specific) expected returns µ and volatilities σ. We also consider competing projects with different
dividends δ; (ii) the decision-maker has risk tolerance λ = 0.4, i.e. a local absolute risk aversion of 2.5;
and (iii) her initial wealth is equal to the current market price of the project, with w0 = p0 = $1m; the
risk-free interest rate is constant, r = 5% and exercise opportunities occur each time the underlying
price moves. We conclude this section by showing how options with negative cash flows, such as a
pharmaceutical research project or land development, are represented in our general framework.
6.1 Positive Cash Flows
Figures 5 and 6 depict two short-horizon decision trees for the invest and divest options on a project
that yields positive cash flows. For instance, the project could be the purchase of real-estate with
regular positive cash flows, such as a buy-to-let residential or office block, or a car park where fees
accrue to its owner for its usage. Rents, denoted xs(t) in the trees, are captured using a positive,
constant dividend yield defined by (6), to capture rents that only increase/decrease in line with the
market price. We suppose cash flows are not re-invested and instead earn the risk-free rate. Each
time a cash flow is paid the market price jumps down from p+t to p
−
t = p
+
t − xt. Between payments
the decision maker expects the discounted market price to grow at rate µ − r, and based on the
discretisation (2) we have p+t+1 = up
−
t or p
+
t+1 = dp
−
t with equal probability. The terminal nodes of
the tree are associated with the increment in wealth w − w0 where the final wealth w is given (8) for
the option to invest in Figure 5, and by (10) for the option to divest (setting the cash flow equal to
the rent in each state) depicted in Figure 6.
Table 5 applies the decision trees in Figures 5 and 6 to rank the options to buy (Fig. 5) and to
sell (Fig. 6) two different buy-to-let properties. In each case rents are paid every six months, and are
set at a constant percentage δ of the market price at the time the rent is paid. But the investor has
different views about the future market price and rents on each property, as characterised by different
values for µ, σ and δ.
Similarly, we rank the decisions (depicted in Figure 6) to sell two different properties, according
to the subjective views on market prices and rents specified in the second pair of columns in Table 5.
The divest ROV is the expected utility value of capital gains on the property plus the expected utility
value of the opportunity to divest with the value of the preferred property marked in bold.
Clearly, the form assumed for the utility function has material consequences for decision making. A
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Table 5: Columns 2 and 3 compare the values of 2 real options, each to purchase a buy-to-let property as
depicted in Figure 5. Columns 4 and 5 compare the values of 2 other options, each to sell a buy-to-let property
currently owned, as in Figure 6. In each case our decision-maker has λ = 0.4 and w0 = $1m, each property has
p0 = $1m and r = 5%. The decision maker’s beliefs about µ, σ and δ depend on the property. For each utility
we highlight in bold the preferred location for buying (or selling) the property.
Invest Divest
σ 40% 25% 30% 20%
µ 15% 10% 15% 10%
δ 10% 10% 20% 10%
Exponential 289 316 6,775 6,052
Hyperbolic 348 339 6,610 6,103
Power 340 336 7,283 6,296
Logarithmic 358 345 4,286 5,330
decision maker with CARA utility would prefer the option to buy the second property, whilst decision
makers with any of the other HARA utilities (and the same risk tolerance at time 0) would prefer to
buy the first property. And for the divest real option values of two other properties both currently
owned by the decision maker, all decision makers except those with a logarithmic utility would favour
selling the first property.
6.2 Negative Cash Flows
In the buy-to-develop case there are no cash flows until the research and development of a pharma-
ceutical project starts, or the building plot is purchased. Thereafter, these negative cash flows should
be accounted for in the market price. Setting a negative, constant dividend yield cannot capture these
properties. Instead, the market price following an invest decision is cum-dividend, but prior to this it
evolves as in the zero cash-flow case. Another important realism to include in the decision-tree is that
the investment horizon T ′ is path dependent now, because it depends on the time of the investment
to buy the rights. For instance, it could take 2 years to develop the drug after purchasing the patent
rights.
A simple buy-to-develop option is depicted in Figure 7, in which the development cost is ys(t) > 0
and p˜t is the cum-dividend market price. The option maturity T is 2 periods, and so is the development
time, so T ′ varies from 2 to 4 periods depending on the time that the project begins. To keep the tree
simple we suppose that development costs are paid only once, after 1 period, to allow for planning
time after purchasing the rights. For example, consider the node labelled Du that arises if the investor
does not purchase the rights at t = 0 and subsequently the market price moves up at t = 1. A decision
to invest at this time leads to four possible outcomes. For instance, following the dotted red lines, if
the price moves up again at t = 2 the development cost at this time is yuu, based on the market price
of uup0. But if the price subsequently moves down at t = 3, the terminal value of the property is
p˜1,uud = d(uup0 + yuu) and the costs are the sum of the price paid for the land and the development
cost, i.e. up0 + yuu.
Table 6 displays some numerical results for the decision tree in Figure 7, reporting the value of
two options to buy-to-develop a project, each with initial market price $1 million and r = 5%, but the
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options have different µ, σ and development costs δ. In each case the development takes one year in
total with the costs paid six months after purchase. In general, a higher development cost for given
µ and σ decreases the buy-to-develop option value, and the decision maker becomes more likely to
defer investment until the market price falls. But the option value also increases with µ and decreases
with σ. We find that option A is preferred by an decision maker with an exponential or logarithmic
utility whereas option B is preferred by an decision maker with a hyperbolic or a power utility. Hence,
different investors that have identical wealth, share the same initial risk tolerance, and hold the same
views about development costs and the evolution of market prices may again rank the values of two
development options differently, just because their risk tolerance has different sensitivity to changes
in wealth.
Table 6: Value comparison of real options to buy two different rights for developing a patent for an R&D
project, depicted in Figure 7. In each case our decision-maker has λ = 0.4 and w0 = $1m, each project has
p0 = $1m and r = 5%. The decision maker’s views on µ, σ and development costs δ differ for each project, as
shown in the table. The preferred option is indicated by the value in bold.
A B
σ 25% 15%
µ 10% 35%
δ 20% 40%
Exponential 289 182
Hyperbolic 299 326
Power 315 350
Logarithmic 41 0
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Figure 5: Option to invest in a property that pays rents, xs(t). T ′ = 3, T = 2, k = 1. Terminal nodes labelled
with (w − w0), cash flows given by (8) with with CF = x following decision to invest (I), and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 6: Option to sell a property paying rents, xs(t). T ′ = 3, T = 2, k = 1. Terminal nodes labelled
(w − w0), cash-flows are (10) with CF = x if the owner remains invested (R), or if the owner sells the property
(S) the cash-flow is difference between the selling price and initial price.
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Figure 7: Decision tree depicting the option to invest in a project for development. If the rights to development
are acquired (I) the development takes 2 periods and development costs occur only after the first period.
Terminal nodes are associated with the P&L, w − w0 resulting from the decision.
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